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Abstract—We consider the querying service (e.g., location-based
query service) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Querying
service has been studied in various kinds of networks such as tra-
ditional mobile phone networks and other mobile ad hoc networks.
However, existing schemes are either not suitable for VANETs
due to their highly dynamic environment or do not provide a
privacy-preserving solution. In this paper, we first discuss the
security concerns of providing a querying service that ensures
that a query will not be linkable to the querier. Then, we briefly
highlight the characteristics of VANETs, which make the problem
different from other types of networks. Finally, we propose a solu-
tion for solving the problem by using techniques of pseudoidentity,
indistinguishable credentials, and oblivious transfer. We show
that, although all infrastructure units collude, it is still impossible
to link the real identity of the user to a query. Based on our
simulation study, we show that our scheme is effective in terms
of processing delay, message overhead, and success rate.
Index Terms—Oblivious transfer (OT), privacy preserving,
pseudoidentity, querying service, vehicular sensor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VEHICULAR ad hoc network (VANET) is initiallydesigned for enhancing driving safety and convenience
through intervehicle communications (IVCs) or communica-
tions with units in the roadside infrastructure. It is an important
element of the intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) [1]. In a
typical VANET, each vehicle has an on-board unit (OBU), and
along the roads, road-side units (RSUs) are installed. A trusted
authority (TA) and, maybe, some other application servers are
installed in the backbone. OBUs and RSUs communicate using
the Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) protocol
[2] over the wireless channel, whereas RSUs, the TA, and the
application servers communicate using a secure fixed network
(e.g., the Internet). An intervehicular communication architec-
ture was proposed in [3], whereas a prototype was built in [4].
The basic application of a VANET is to allow arbitrary vehicles
to broadcast safety messages (e.g., road condition and traffic
accident information) to other nearby vehicles and RSUs such
that other vehicles may adjust their traveling routes, and RSUs
may inform the traffic control center to adjust traffic lights for
avoiding possible traffic congestion. Some other applications
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allow a group of known vehicles (e.g., police cars and tour
buses) to securely communicate among themselves.
Similar to the mobile phone network, after fulfilling basic
functions, the trend is to make use of the framework to provide
value-added services. One such service is querying service. One
well-known example is the location-based querying service
(e.g., seeking the location of the closest Chinese restaurant).
We assume that one or more querying service providers (QSPs)
are installed in the backbone. They have huge databases that
contain information on points-of-interest (POIs) in its region
or even in the whole city, and this information is collected
using approaches similar to the technique in [5]. Drivers who
pass by can issue queries about POIs to a QSP. Similar to
existing location-based querying services for web applications
[6], a querying service for VANETs may be a paid service. The
charging model can be on a per-query basis to allow drivers who
may not be a permanent resident in the city to use the service in
an ad hoc manner. There should be a mechanism for recording
which vehicles have used the querying service so that bills can
be issued to them.
On the other hand, the user may not want anyone (including
the infrastructure units such as RSUs), except for the QSP, to
know the content of his/her query. To further protect a user’s
privacy, although all RSUs, TAs, and QSPs collude, it should be
impossible to link up a query with the real identity of the user.
For example, a driver who issued a query to a QSP to ask for the
location of the nearest nightclub may not want anyone to know
about it. The same confidential and privacy-preserving issue oc-
curs when making other kinds of queries. For example, a driver
who issued queries to a QSP to get more information about a
product may not want other users to know in which product
he/she is interested. The difficulty of the problem is on how
we can record or validate the user for using the service while
making sure that the query and the real identity of the driver is
not linkable. On the other hand, a user can use the service only
once for each validation. This requirement makes the problem
nontrivial. One simpler approach can be adopted if this require-
ment can be relaxed [7]. We will formally define our system
model, assumptions, and security requirements in Section III.
Summary of Our Contributions: In this paper, we propose
an OT-based Private Querying (OPQ) scheme for solving the
confidential and privacy-preserving problem for querying ser-
vices in VANETs. Our scheme is based on the techniques of
pseudoidentity and indistinguishable credentials. To use the ser-
vice, a driver first has to authenticate himself/herself to a nearby
RSU. Then, the RSU passes his/her Ns credentials, where Ns
is a system parameter, and we will evaluate the performance
of our system as Ns varies. Using the principle of oblivious
transfer (OT) [8], the RSU cannot tell which Ns credentials
it has passed to the driver. By presenting the Ns credentials
1524-9050/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE
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obtained to a QSP, a driver can accordingly issue its query.
This way, although all RSUs, TAs, and QSPs collude, no one
can link up a query with the real identity of the querier. Other
basic security issues, e.g., message integrity and confidentiality,
are also addressed in this paper. We will explain our scheme in
detail in Section V. We show that our schemes are effective in
terms of processing delay, message overhead, and success rate
based on a simulation study.
II. RELATED WORK
The privacy-preserving querying problem for mobile devices
(e.g., mobile phones) has been addressed in [9]–[11]. In [9],
a simple public key infrastructure (PKI) is adopted, and an
anonymity router (AR) is introduced between the mobile device
and the QSP. In brief, the return address (e.g., mobile phone
number) of the mobile device is encrypted using the AR’s
public key, whereas the query is encrypted using the QSP’s
public key. This solution seems to work, but it does not consider
the case that the AR and the QSP collude. In VANETs, RSUs
are located along the road; therefore, it is easier to be hacked.
To provide a higher level of privacy, we should have a solution
that can still maintain the privacy, although the infrastructure
units collude. The return addresses of mobile devices and their
queries can easily be linked if the AR and the QSP share
their information. In [10] and [11], it is assumed that, if the
current location of the device (e.g., mobile phone) is known,
the identity of the user will be revealed. Therefore, both parties
try to hide the current location of the querying device. Rather
than using a cryptographic approach, they use networking
approaches. In [10], a mobile user who wants to use the service
first collects the locations of some nearby devices to form a so-
called cloaked spatial region. It then sends out the whole region
to the QSP, which then returns the POI location that is closest to
the cloaked spatial region. This solution suffers two drawbacks.
First, the POI location is only the closest to the cloaked spatial
region but may not be the closest to the querier. Second, in a
VANET setting, it is not always possible to find other neighbors
to form a cloaked spatial region. For example, the traffic density
is usually very low on a countryside highway. In [11], a mobile
user who wants to issue location-based queries first sends out
a fake location. Upon receiving a reply from the QSP, it incre-
mentally adjusts the fake location and sends out new queries.
This process repeats until the result from the QSP is accurate
enough for the user’s purpose. Obviously, such a repeated
querying process requires very heavy transmission overhead
and induces very heavy computation overhead at the QSP.
Providing a location-based querying service in a multihop
mobile ad hoc network (MANET) environment has been ad-
dressed in a number of efforts, e.g., [12]. However, none
of these efforts addresses the privacy preservation problem.
Recently, in [13], a hierarchical approach has been proposed,
and this approach can be extended to easily provide privacy
preservation. The whole network is split into small regions, and
each region has a head node, which maintains the information
of all other nodes. Head nodes of different regions are then
connected to higher level nodes. This process repeats, and a
multilevel hierarchy is formed. In the querying process, each
region in the hierarchy can then work as a cloaked spatial re-
gion, and thus, the privacy of the querier is preserved similar to
the approach in [10]. Obviously this scheme is not suitable for
a VANET environment, because in a VANET, vehicles move at
high speed most of the time, and the network topology rapidly
changes. Thus, it is impossible for a multilevel hierarchy to be
maintained. A summary of all previous networking approaches
that provide privacy-preserving location-based querying ser-
vices can be found in a recent paper [14].
Our scheme is based on the idea of an indistinguishable
(anonymous) credential. Such a credential system was intro-
duced by Chaum [15]. The system allows a user to obtain a
credential from one organization and later show the possession
of the credential to another organization, whereas the trans-
actions at the two organizations are not linkable. The idea of
anonymous credential has been adopted in different applica-
tions. For example, [16] proposes a credential-based privacy-
preserving e-learning system under which a student can show
his/her progress in e-learning without leaking his/her identity
information. The application that is closest to our approach
is the anticollusion anonymous credentials scheme proposed
in [17]. The selection of credential is also based on OT, but
the requirements are different and, therefore, cannot easily be
adopted to our case. First, the approach requires the transfer
of a credential from one user to another to be inconvenient;
therefore, each user has to pick a large number of credentials
from an organization. The required complexity is very high for
the highly dynamic VANET environment. On the other hand,
nontransferability is not needed in our scheme. In our case, the
credential that a user possesses should be used only once.
Other works related to the security issues in VANET include
[18]–[23]. In [19], a batch verification scheme was proposed for
an RSU to verify a large number of signatures at the same time
using only three pairing operations. In [18], an RSU-aided IVC
scheme was proposed. A vehicle relies on an RSU to verify the
signature of another vehicle. In [20], group communications in
VANETs are considered, and a group key update protocol was
proposed. In [21] and [22], some security and privacy-enhancing
communications schemes (SPECSs) were proposed. Of partic-
ular interest, a group communications protocol was defined.
After a simple handshaking with any RSU, a group of known ve-
hicles can verify the signature of each other without any further
support from RSUs. A common group secret is also developed
for secure communications among group members. Most re-
cently, in [23], an approach for privacy-aware traffic monitoring
has been proposed based on the idea of data aggregation.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
A. System Model and Assumptions
Recall that we consider a vehicular network that consists of
OBUs installed on vehicles and RSUs along the roads. A TA
maintains the real identities of vehicles and a QSP, which is
responsible for answering queries from vehicles. We further
assume the following conditions.
1) The QSP is always online so that when a vehicle issues
a query, the QSP can answer it in real time. Again, to
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avoid being a single point of failure, redundant QSPs
are installed. These QSPs periodically synchronize their
databases.
2) RSUs, TAs, and QSPs communicate through a secure
fixed network (e.g., the Internet).
3) There exists a conventional PKI for initial handshaking.
Any RSU R periodically broadcasts its identity IDR and
conventional public key CPKR with hello messages to
vehicles that travel within the RSU-to-vehicle communi-
cation (RVC) range. Thus, CPKR is known by all nearby
vehicles.
4) The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the TA
and itself but not by other parties.
5) A reasonably large number of queries are issued to the
QSP. It is because, if there is only one query, the sender
can easily be linked up with the query.
B. Security Requirements
We aim at designing a scheme for the provision of confi-
dentiality and privacy-preserving querying service in VANETs.
The following security requirements have to be satisfied.
1) Message authentication. A vehicle should be authenti-
cated before it can issue a query.
2) Identity privacy preserving. The real identity of a vehicle
should be kept anonymous from other vehicles, and a
third party should not reveal a vehicle’s real identity by
analyzing multiple messages that it sent.
3) Traceability. Although a vehicle’s real identity should
be hidden from other vehicles, the TA should obtain a
vehicle’s real identity so that it can be charged for using
the querying service.
4) Confidentiality. The content of a query that is sent by a
vehicle should be kept confidential. Only QSPs can read
the contents.
5) Unlinkability. Although all RSUs, TAs, and QSPs col-
lude, they cannot link a vehicle’s query with its real
identity.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Maps
Our schemes are pairing based and are defined on two cyclic
groups with a mapping called a bilinear map [24]. Let G be a
cyclic additive group and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group.
Both groups G and GT have the same prime order q. The
mapping eˆ: G×G→ GT is called a bilinear map if it satisfies
the following properties.
1) Bilinear. ∀P , Q, R ∈ G, and ∀a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(Q,P +R) =
eˆ(P +R,Q) = eˆ(P,Q) · eˆ(R,Q). In addition,
eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P, bP )a = eˆ(aP, P )b = eˆ(P, P )ab.
2) Nondegenerate. There exists P , Q ∈ G, such that
eˆ(P,Q) = 1GT .
3) Computable. There exists an efficient algorithm for com-
puting eˆ(P,Q) for any P , Q ∈ G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed using pairings on el-
liptic curves. Each operation for computing eˆ(P,Q) is referred
to as a pairing operation. The groups G and GT are called
bilinear groups. The security of our scheme relies on the fact
that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on bilinear groups
is computationally hard, i.e., given the point Q = aP , there
exists no efficient algorithm for obtaining a, given P and Q.
The implication is that we can transfer Q in an open wireless
channel without worrying that a (usually some secret) can be
known by any attackers.
B. Oblivious Transfer (OT)
Our scheme also adopts the principle of OT when an RSU
passes one or more credentials to a vehicle. The idea is ex-
plained as follows. An RSU passes Nc valid credentials to the
vehicle, the vehicle is allowed to pick Ns of them only, whereas
the RSU does not know which Ns credentials the vehicle has
picked. OT has several variations, e.g., 1 out of 2, 1 out of n, and
m out of n. In [8], there is a very recent work on OT. Interested
readers can refer to it for technical details.
V. OUR SOLUTIONS
This section presents our proposed scheme for provid-
ing a confidential and privacy-preserving querying service in
VANETs.
Following [21] and [22], we assume that the parameters
{G,GT, q, P, Ppub} are generated and made public by the TA.
In addition, each vehicle is assigned a real identity RID ∈ G
and a password PWD during network deployment or vehicle
first registration. Furthermore, assume that each vehicle Vi has
already performed an initial handshaking with a nearby RSU
and TA and obtained the TA’s master key s, the shared secret
mi with the RSU, and the shared secret ti with the TA. The
RSU has also obtained Vi’s verification public key V PKi =
ti ⊕RIDi from the TA for verifying Vi’s pseudoidentity in the
future. Note that the TA assigns different ti (and, thus, different
V PKi) when Vi enters different RSUs’ ranges; therefore,
although all RSUs collude, they cannot trace a vehicle’s route.
Fig. 1 gives an overview of our scheme. There are the
following five basic modules.
1) The QSP generates its public and private key pair.
2) The QSP generates credentials and passes a set of Nc
credentials to each RSU.
3) The RSU verifies a vehicle’s identity for billing purposes
in the future.
4) The RSU passes the vehicle a subset of Ns credentials
using the principle of OT.
5) The vehicle sends its query by presenting the subset
of Ns credentials to the QSP. Then, the QSP answers
accordingly.
Next, we will explain these modules one by one.
A. Key Generation by the QSP
A QSP generates a random number SKq to be used as its
private key. It then computes the corresponding public key
as PKq = (SKq)P . SKq is kept private, whereas PKq is
publicly known by all RSUs and all vehicles.
1416 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2011
Fig. 1. Overview of our scheme.
B. Generation of Credentials by the QSP
A QSP generates a set of credentials for each RSU, and
different RSUs possess different sets of credentials. An RSU
can request for a new set of credentials when there is a need (see
Section VII). A querying vehicle obtains a subset of credentials
from an RSU to use the querying service. The QSP maintains a
database to store the subset of credential numbers presented by
each querying vehicle. In addition, this database is periodically
synchronized with all mirror QSPs so that all mirror QSPs
know which credentials are valid and have not been used. To
generate a credential, the QSP first picks a random number
Ri and checks whether Ri is already a credential number in
its database. This process repeats until a value for Ri that
does not appear as an existing credential number is found. Ri
then becomes the credential number of the newly generated
credential, and the QSP stores it into its database. The new
credential is of the format Cri = {Ri, ESIGSKq (Ri)}. Here,
ESIGSKq (Ri) = (SKq)H(Ri), where H(.) is a MapToPoint
hash function [25], and represents the signature of the QSP on
the credential number Ri. The QSP altogether generates a set of
Nc credentials for each RSU, where Nc is a system parameter.
At a long-enough interval, earlier entries of the database can be
cleared so that credential numbers can be reused. In addition,
note that the signature ESIGSKq (Ri) is a pair of coordinates
(xi, yi) for representing a point on the elliptic curve. Therefore,
we can simply assume that each credential appears to be a
sequence of bits (i.e., a number) and is a special concatenation
of the three components Ri, xi, and yi. Any holder can extract
the three components in a straightforward manner.
C. Verification of Vehicle Identities by the RSU
Because the querying service that is provided by the QSP
is a paid service, there must be a way for the system to keep
track of which vehicles have used the service and then to charge
them later on. (Note that, even with this tracing functionality,
a vehicle’s query still cannot be linked up with its real or
pseudoidentity by any party.) In our schemes, RSUs and the
TA will take up this role.
When vehicle Vi wants to use the querying service, it first
generates a random nonce r. Its pseudoidentity IDi contains
the following two parts: 1) IDi1 and 2) IDi2. Here, IDi1 =
rPpub, and IDi2 = V PKi ⊕H(miIDi1). The corresponding
signing key is SKi = (SKi1, SKi2), where SKi1 = smiIDi1,
and SKi2 = sH(IDi2). H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function as
aforementioned. It then generates the querying service request
message Mi = {QSREQ} and its signature SIGSKi(Mi) =
SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2 on it. Here, h(.) is a one-way hash func-
tion such as secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA1) [26]. Vi then sends
〈IDi,Mi, SIGSKi(Mi)〉 to the RSU.
The RSU verifies signatures in querying service request
messages in a batch (if it receives more than one querying
service request message in a batch verification interval). With
the pseudoidentity of each vehicle Vi, the RSU first extracts
Vi’s verification public key V PKi and shared secret mi by
checking which of the stored (V PKj ,mj) pairs (sent by TA
previously) satisfies IDi2 = V PKj ⊕H(mjIDi1). Without
loss of generality, assume the RSU receives the querying
service request messages from V1, V2, . . . , Vn and it verifies
their signatures by checking if eˆ(
∑n
i=1 SIGSKi(Mi), P ) =
eˆ(
∑n
i=1 miIDi1 + h(Mi)H(IDi2), Ppub). The RSU can also
adopt the binary-search approach to check the validity of each
individual signature.
If a vehicle’s signature is valid, a credential will be issued
for it to use the QSP’s service. The RSU then records Vi’s
pseudoidentity into a database. At a later time (e.g., every
midnight), all pseudoidentities stored in the RSU’s database
are transferred to the TA. The TA then computes vehicles’ real
identities for issuing charging bills later on.
D. Credential Transfer by RSU
Assume that Vi’s signature is found to be valid. In addi-
tion, assume that the RSU possesses the set of credentials
Cr0, Cr1, . . . , CrNc−1. The RSU transfers Ns credentials,
where Ns is a system parameter, to Vi using the following
steps.
1) The RSU picks a random number SKr to be used as its
private key and computes PKr = (SKr)P to be used
as its public key. It sends to Vi (or to all queriers if there
are more than one message) the message Mr = 〈PKr,
h0, h1, . . . , hNc−1, ESIGSKq (h0), ESIGSKq (h1), . . . ,
ESIGSKq (hNc−1)〉 and its signature CSIGSKr (Mr).
Here, hi is a one-way-hash [26] of the ith credential (i.e.,
hi = h(Cri)), and ESIGSKq (hi) is the QSP’s signature
on hi.
2) Vi first verifies the RSU’s signature on Mr. Then, it
randomly picks Ns integers a0, . . . , aNs−1 in the range
[0, Nc − 1]. It also picks another two random numbers x
and k, computes the points xP and kP , and composes
the message Mi = 〈xP, Temp10, . . . , T emp1(Ns−1)〉
where Temp1j = kP + xPKr + ajP . It sends
〈IDi,Mi, SIGSKi(Mi)〉 to the RSU. Note that the
pseudoidentity and the signing key used by Vi here are
the same as in its QSREQ message.
3) Upon receiving xP and each Temp1j for all i in
the range [0, Nc − 1] (recall that RSU does not know
which i vehicle Vi has chosen), the RSU multiplies xP
by its secret key SKr and subtracts the product from
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Temp1j − iP . That is, it tries to obtain k′P to be the
decryption of Temp1j − iP . It then includes Temp2i =
Cri + h(k′P ) into message Mr, which will be sent to
Vi. After considering all Vi’s choices, Mr should con-
tain Nc ×NsTemp2i values. Finally, the RSU sends to
Vi {IDi,Mr, CSIGSKr (Mr)}. Note that the RSU has
to include IDi in the message, because it can perform
OT with more than one vehicle at the same time.
4) Upon ensuring that the RSU’s message is for it and veri-
fying the RSU’s signature, because Vi knows the value of
k′, which is equal to k that it has picked earlier, it can
compute Craj =Temp2aj−h(kP ) for all j in the range
[0, Ns−1]. Next, Vi verifies whether Cra0 , . . . , CraNs−1
are the credentials that it chose by checking whether haj=
h(Craj ) for all j in [0, Ns − 1] and validating the QSP’s
signature on ha0 , . . . , haNs−1 . The signature validation
can be done by checking whether eˆ(ESIGSKq (haj ),
P ) = eˆ(H(haj ), PKq) as eˆ((SKq)H(haj ), P ) =
eˆ(H(haj ), (SKq)P ) = eˆ(H(haj ), PKq).
5) To ensure that the RSU does not perform a same-message
attack (once this attack has been done, an RSU can cheat
Vi to pick certain credentials, as mentioned in [27]),
it checks whether hi = h(Craj ) for all i 
 [a0, aNs−1]
after using the QSP’s public key to verify ESIGSKq (hi).
Note that, among the Nc − 1 decryptions that the RSU makes
in step 3, only Ns of the k′ values (i.e., corresponding to the
i chosen by Vi) matches the k value chosen by Vi, whereas
all other values are garbage. Thus, Vi can only obtain the
credentials Cra0 , . . . , CraNs−1 but not other credentials.
Finally, the RSU stores Vi’s pseudoidentity (only one,
although a number of messages from Vi are involved in the
aforementioned process) and the corresponding shared secret
mi into its database. At a later time, all pseudoidentities and
shared secrets stored in the RSU’s database are transferred to
the TA. With Vi’s pseudoidentity IDi and mi, the TA can
search through all the stored (RIDj , tj) pairs from its reposit-
ory. Vehicle Vi’s real identity is the RIDj value from the entry
that satisfies the expression IDi2 ⊕ tj ⊕H(miIDi1) = RIDj
as IDi2 ⊕ tj ⊕H(miIDi1) = ti ⊕RIDj ⊕H(miIDi1)⊕
ti ⊕H(miIDi1) = RIDj . No other party can obtain vehicle
Vi’s real identity, because ti is known only by the TA and Vi
itself. Then, charging bills can be issued accordingly.
E. Query and Answer Forwarding
Vi then generates and stores a random number y that will
be used as a temporary symmetric session key for the current
querying session. The value of y is encrypted using the QSP’s
public key PKq = (SKq)P , whereas the credential and its
query QUERY are symmetrically encrypted using y. Finally, it
sends the message 〈EENCPKq (y), ENCy(Cra, QUERY )〉
to the QSP through any RSU. Note that the value of y is only
known by the QSP, and Vi’s query is encrypted using y. Thus,
the QSP is the only party who knows what Vi is querying. In
addition, note that, aside from the credential, Vi does not need
to present any identity information (not even its pseudoidentity)
in its query.
Upon receiving Vi’s query, the QSP first decrypts
EENCPKq (y) using its secret key SKq and obtains y. Then,
it decrypts ENCy(Cra, QUERY ) using y and obtains the
credential and the query. The QSP first checks from its data-
base whether the same set of credential numbers presented
by Vi have been presented by any other vehicle. If yes, it
sends an error message 〈Mq, ESIGSKq (Mq)〉, where Mq =
{Credential Reuse Error}, to Vi. Upon getting this error,
Vi will present its pseudoidentity used in its QSREQ message
and the QSP’s signed error message to the RSU. After verifying
the QSP’s signature on the error message, the RSU will repeat
the steps in Section V-D to let Vi pick another Ns credential.
Note that, by presenting the QSP’s signed error message, any
RSU will add a remark to the database so that Vi will not be
charged more than once for a single query. In Section VII, we
will show that, if an RSU updates all its credentials on time,
such a credential reuse error is quite unlikely.
If the QSP finds that the set of Ns credentials has not
been presented by other parties, for each credential, it verifies
whether Cra = {Ra, ESIGSKq (Ra)} is signed by it by
checking whether eˆ(ESIGSKq (Ra), P ) = eˆ(H(Ra), PKq)
as eˆ((SKq)H(Ra), P ) = eˆ(H(Ra), (SKq)P ) = eˆ(H(Ra),
PKq). After confirming that all Ns credentials presented
by Vi are valid and the same set has not been presented by
other parties, the QSP searches through its database and tries
to answer Vi’s query. Because the objective of this paper is
to ensure that Vi can securely and confidentially issue its
query, we will not discuss how the QSP searches for answers
associated with Vi’s query. See, e.g., [11]. Once the QSP has
received the answer ANSWER to Vi’s query, it generates
the reply Mq = 〈EENCPKq (y), ENCy(ANSWER)〉 and
sends it to Vi through the RSU. Note that EENCPKq (y)
is included in the reply and is used as the query’s
pseudoidentity so that Vi knows that the QSP, indeed,
answers its question. In addition, because all mirror QSPs have
identical functionalities and databases, an RSU only needs to
forward a query to the physically closest QSP to reduce the
response time.
If, after a predefined interval, vehicle Vi still has not received
the reply from the QSP, it assumes that either its query message
for the QSP or the QSP’s answer for it has been corrupted by
noise in the environment or blocked by obstacles, and it resends
its previous query to the QSP.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze our scheme with respect to the security require-
ments listed in Section III.
A. Message Integrity and Authentication
The signature SIGSKi(Mi) on message Mi by vehicle Vi
is composed of SKi1 and SKi2. SKi1 is defined as smiIDi1,
where mi is the shared secret between vehicle Vi and the RSU.
Because mi has securely been transmitted from the RSU to Vi
during initial handshaking, no one. except for Vi and the RSU,
knows its value. Thus, no other vehicle knows how SKi1 can
be composed. SKi2, on the other hand, is defined as sH(IDi2).
Recall that IDi2 = V PKi ⊕H(miIDi1). Again, because no
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other vehicle knows mi and, therefore, only Vi can compute
SKi2, no other vehicle can forge a valid signature by vehicle
Vi. Note also that RSUs do not know the master secret s and
thus cannot forge Vi’s signature.
B. Identity Privacy Preserving
Identity privacy preserving is an important feature of our
scheme. We formally show that an attacker cannot easily obtain
a vehicle’s real identity. Because the only information that is
related to a vehicle’s real identity and is exposed in the network
is its pseudoidentity, we show that an attacker cannot obtain
a vehicle’s real identity, although it has the pseudoidentity. We
argue that, if the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) is hard, then
the pseudoidentity of a vehicle can preserve its real identity. The
proof is given as follows.
We first consider game 1 between a challenger and an
attacker.
Setup: The challenger starts by giving the attacker a set of
system parameters, including P and Ppub.
Choose: The attacker then freely chooses two verification
public keys V PK0 and V PK1 and sends them to the
challenger (these choices do not need to be random, and
the attacker can choose them in any way that it desires).
Challenge: The challenger sets a bit x = 0 with probability 1/2
and sets x = 1 with probability 1/2. The challenger then
sends the attacker the pseudoidentity that corresponds to
V PKx together with the group public key.
Guess: The attacker tries to guess the value of x that is chosen
by the challenger and outputs its guess x′.
The attacker’s advantage in this game is defined to be Pr[x =
x′]− 1/2. We say that our pseudoidentity generation algorithm
is semantically secure against a chosen plaintext attack (CPA)
if the attacker’s advantage is negligible.
Next, we assume that we have an algorithm A that runs in
polynomial time and has a nonnegligible advantage e as the
attacker in game 1. We will construct game 2, in which a
DDH attacker B can make use of A to achieve a nonnegligible
advantage in breaking the DDH. B is given a DDH instance
(P, aP, bP, T ) as input and is asked to determine whether
T = abP . We further let t denote a bit that B tries to guess
(i.e., t = 0 for a positive answer T = abP , whereas t = 1 for a
negative answer T = abP ). Game 2 runs as follows.
Setup: Based on the DDH instance, B makes up the parameters
(P, Ppub = aP ) and gives them to A. Note that a now
plays the role of s in our SPECS.
Choose: A then chooses two verification public keys V PK0
and V PK1 and sends them to B.
Challenge: B plays the role of challenger here; therefore, it
randomly sets a bit x and generates the pseudoidentity
ID = (ID1, ID2), where ID1 = raP , ID2 = V PKx ⊕
H(rT ), and r is a random nonce and sends to A. (Note that
b now plays the role of the RSU vehicle shared secret mi
in our SPECS.)
Guess: Finally, A sends B a bit x′ as its guess for x. B
positively answers the DDH problem that T = abP if B’s
guess is correct (i.e., x = x′).
Now, let us look at why B can answer the DDH problem
in this way. If t = 0 (i.e., T = abP ), then ID2 = V PKb ⊕
H(rabP ) = V PKb ⊕H(bID1) is a valid pseudoidentity in
proper format. In this case, because A has a nonnegligible
advantage in the aforementioned game, it is likely that A can
break our SPECS system and correctly guess x with probability
1/2 + . Thus, Pr[Bsucceeds|t = 0] = 1/2 + . If t = 1, we
claim that Pr[Bsucceeds|t = 1] = 1/2 only. To see why, we
observe that, when T is randomly chosen, the term H(rT ) in
ID2 cannot be canceled by the term H(bID1), and therefore,
there is no way of obtaining V PKx. Thus, the computation re-
veals no information about x. In this sense, the value of x is hid-
den to A; therefore, although A can break our SPECS system,
the probability of correctly guessing x is simply 1/2 (by toss-
ing a fair coin). Hence, Pr[Bsucceeds] = 1/2× (1/2 + ) +
1/2× 1/2 = 1/2 + /2. Because  is nonnegligible, B can
solve the DDH problem, but this case violates the assumption
that DDH is hard. Therefore, our scheme is secure, because the
pseudoidentity of a vehicle can preserve its real identity. 
On the other hand, the random nonce r makes the
pseudoidentity of a vehicle different in different messages. This
approach makes tracing the location of a particular vehicle
over time difficult without the shared secret between the sender
and the RSU. Furthermore, because the verification public key
V PKi of a certain vehicle is different, as shown by different
RSUs, although all RSUs collude, they have no way of tracing
a particular vehicle’s traveling route.
C. Traceability and Revocability
Section V-C shows that the TA can trace a vehicle’s real
identity; thus, traceability is satisfied.
D. Unlinkability
We first prove the correctness of the OT of credentials from
RSU to a vehicle, because this case is the key to removing the
linkage between a credential and its holder’s identity. Note that
vehicle Vi sends its choices to the RSU in an “encrypted” way
in step 2. The message that it sends includes Temp1j = kP +
xPKr + ajP = (k + aj + xSKr)P for all j in the range
[0, Ns − 1]. Because the RSU does not know the values of k
and x, it has no way of obtaining the value of aj . Therefore,
the RSU does not know which credentials Vi has obtained.
Although it cooperates with the QSP, they have no way of
linking up the credential used by Vi and its identity.
E. Confidentiality
A randomly generated session key is encrypted using the
QSP’s public key. The query and the answer are, in turn,
encrypted using this session key. Thus, the QSP is the only party
that knows what the query and the answer are.
VII. OBTAINING A NEW SET OF CREDENTIALS
In this section, we briefly discuss when an RSU should
request for a new set of credentials from the QSP.
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Fig. 2. Average number of rounds versus the total number of credentialsNc.
We illustrate the idea using a simple experiment as follows.
We assume that the RSU handles querying service requests
from 30 vehicles in a certain period. The RSU lets each vehicle
pick Ns credentials from a pool of Nc credentials at random.
We vary the value of Nc from 0 to 300 in steps of 10 (in real
situations, the value of Nc should not be very large to limit the
decryption time spent by RSU in OT) and try three values of
Ns (1, 2, and 3) to study their impact on the average number
of rounds that a vehicle needs to obtain Ns credentials such
that the same subset have not been used. Recall that, if the QSP
finds that the subset of Ns credentials presented by a vehicle
has been used, it will ask the vehicle to go back to the RSU to
get another Ns credential.
The result is shown in Fig. 2, in which each point of data is
obtained from 100 random scenarios. When Ns is set to 1, 2,
and 3, the minimum value of Nc required is 30, 6, and 5, and
the corresponding numbers of rounds are 4.2, 4, and 1.4,
respectively. A smaller Nc leads to an infinite round number.
However, the round numbers stabilize to close to 1 when Nc is
set to 90, 20, and 10 (i.e., 3, 2/3, and 1/3 times the number of ve-
hicles) under the three cases. Thus, we suggest an RSU request
for a new set of credentials after it served Nc/3, 1.5Nc, and 3Nc
vehicles when the value of Ns is set to 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our scheme in terms of processing
delay, message overhead, and success rate using a network
simulation program. Our scheme is the first approach to ad-
dress the privacy-querying problem in VANETs. Other related
schemes (e.g., approaches that are designed for mobile devices
and MANETs, as discussed in Section II) are under different
settings and cannot be applied to VANETs. Therefore, our
simulation aims at showing the performance of our scheme
under different conditions. Through simulation, we show that
the processing delay and message overhead caused by our
cryptographic functions are acceptable. On the other hand, the
success rate of our scheme is almost the same as transmitting
a single normal message over wireless channel as the channel
collision probability varies.
A. Simulation Models
In our simulation, we made use of two maps that are
downloaded from the TIGER database [28]: One map is for
Washington, DC, whereas the other map is for Texas.
Washington, DC, represents a city road system in which most
roads have a speed limit of 50 km/h. Texas represents a coun-
tryside road system in which some highways have speed limits
of up to 120 km/h. RSUs are randomly placed onto each road.
Considering speeding behavior, we assume that vehicles in
Washington, DC, travel at speed that varies from 10 km/h to
70 km/h, whereas vehicles in Texas travel at speed that varies
from 70 km/h to 140 km/h.
Some of the settings and parameters of our simulation are
adopted from [18], [19], [21], and [22]. The RVC and IVC
ranges are set to 600 and 300 m, respectively. In the backbone,
there are TA and QSP servers. RSUs, the TA, and the QSP com-
municate with each other through a fixed infrastructure. The
bandwidth of the DSRC channel and the fixed infrastructure
are assumed to be 6 and 10 Mb/s, respectively. With regard
to the processing time, following the benchmark in [29] and
[19], we assume that each pairing operation takes 4.5 ms, each
point multiplication over an elliptic curve takes 0.6 ms, each
conventional asymmetric encryption takes 1.2 ms, whereas
each conventional symmetric encryption takes only 0.6 ms. We
further assume that the QSP requires a database checking time
of 15 ms (roughly the time for three pairing operations) before
it can answer a query.
Following [19], we set the sizes of the pseudoidentity,
the elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)-type signature, and the
ECC-type public key to 42, 21, and 21 B, respectively. We
further set the sizes of components that are newly introduced in
our scheme and provide our reasons as follows. For a random
number, we set its size to 21 B. With this length, two credentials
may carry the same credential number only after about 4× 1050
credentials have been generated. This approach should be more
than sufficient for VANET usage. Thus, the size of each cre-
dential becomes 42 B, because each credential is composed
of a random number and an ECC-type signature. For control
messages such as QSREQ and ACK, we set their size to 5 B.
In our proposed scheme, the longest control message in sym-
bolic format is of five characters only. In case a binary format
is used, these 5 B can even support up to 240 different control
messages. Therefore, we argue that 5 B should be sufficient for
control messaging in a VANET. For a query and an answer, we
set their size to 255 B, which is equivalent to 255 characters.
Our scheme is designed for short queries and answers, e.g., a
short message service (SMS) in a mobile phone network [30].
Compared with the maximum size of 160 characters for an
SMS, our 255 B can already support a much longer message.
The IEEE 802.11a standard is used to simulate the medium
access control (MAC) layer. That is, when a vehicle wants to
transmit, it first detects whether the channel is available. If the
channel is continuously idle for a distributed coordination func-
tion interframe space (DIFS) duration, it starts its transmission.
If the channel is found to be busy during the DIFS interval, it
waits until the channel is available and defers its access for an
extra period of random()× aSlotT ime. Then, it senses the
channel for another DIFS duration before it starts its transmis-
sion. The whole process repeats if the channel is again found
to be busy. According to the IEEE 802.11a standard, DIFS is
defined to be 34 μs, whereas aSlotT ime is defined to be 9 μs.
In our simulation, random() is a number in the range 0–9.
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Fig. 3. Normalized delay versus channel collision probability.
Fig. 4. Message overhead versus channel collision probability.
We define the collision probability of a wireless channel as
the probability that the channel is occupied by other parties
when a vehicle wants to transmit. A high channel collision
probability value simulates the situation that several neighbor-
ing vehicles try to transmit at about the same time. For our
simulation, we vary the collision probability from 0 to 0.32 in
steps of 0.01 (we will show that, when the collision probability
is greater than 0.32, even a single normal message transmission
cannot be completed due to an infinite waiting time).
We perform the following two experiments: one exper-
iment is for Washington, DC, and another experiment for
Texas. In each experiment, we consider 1000 queries made by
1000 vehicles, whose speeds vary from 10 km/h to 70 km/h for
Washington and from 70 km/h to 140 km/h for Texas. Each data
point in Figs. 3–5 represents the average performance of these
1000 vehicles.
We define processing delay to be the duration from when a
vehicle sends out its querying service request message to when
it receives an answer from the QSP through a nearby RSU.
In Fig. 3, we normalized the processing delay experienced
by a vehicle by the duration that it stays in the range of the
corresponding RSU (without loss of generality, we assume that
a vehicle issues its querying service request message once it
has entered an RSU’s range and that it is not blocked within the
range concerned). For Washington, DC, a vehicle stays in an
RSU’s range for 31–214 s, depending on its speed. Similarly,
for Texas, a vehicle stays in an RSU’s range for 15–31 s.
Message overhead, on the other hand, is defined as the actual
Fig. 5. Success rate versus channel collision probability.
data overhead induced by our scheme. One point that we must
add here is that, to make each data point presentable, for both
normalized delay and message overhead, we only consider data
that is noninfinity. We define success rate as the percentage of
noninfinity data among the 1000 vehicles (i.e., the percentage of
queries that can be completed in reasonable time). In addition,
we compare the cases with different values of Ns (1, 2, and 3).
B. Simulation Results
In the first set of experiments, we consider vehicles in
Washington, DC. In Fig. 3, we can see that a longer delay is
required if each vehicle is allowed to pick only one credential.
This case can be explained using the following two reasons:
1) to reduce the hitting probability (the probability that two or
more vehicles obtain the same credential), the credential pool at
any RSU has to be large enough; however, this case implies that
an RSU has to spend a longer time to encrypt more credentials
for each OT session, and 2) referring to Section VII, although an
RSU has 90 credentials, the average number of rounds required
by a vehicle to obtain an unused credential is still more than the
cases with Ns = 2 and Ns = 3. Thus, a longer time is needed
for a vehicle to obtain an unused credential. On the contrary,
if each vehicle is allowed to pick two or three credentials (the
vehicle then presents all these two or three credentials to the
QSP), the RSU only needs to keep 20 and 10 credentials in
the pool, respectively, to achieve the same hitting probability.
The significant save in encryption time here yields a better delay
performance. Nevertheless, under all cases, the processing
delay required by our scheme is less than 0.2% of the
duration that the vehicle stays in an RSU’s range. Thus, there
should be sufficient time to complete the whole querying
process.
Fig. 4 shows the message overhead caused by our querying
scheme in terms of bytes. The Ns = 1 case gives the highest
message overhead and the Ns = 2 case gives the middle over-
head, whereas the Ns = 3 case gives the lowest overhead. Such
a difference is mainly caused by the number of credentials kept
by each RSU. With more credentials in the pool, more hash
values, more QSP signatures, and more encrypted values have
to be transmitted from an RSU to the querying vehicle. Higher
message overhead thus results.
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Fig. 5 elaborates the success rate under different values of
Ns. Interestingly, it is shown that the success rate is almost
the same under different values of Ns. For comparison, we
also include a line for the single normal (not caused by our
scheme) message transmission case. It is easily shown that the
impact of our scheme on the success rate is not significant,
because, except at a channel collision probability of 0.33, the
success rate of our scheme is the same as in single normal
message transmission. That is, under the same channel collision
probability, if a query cannot be completed with our scheme, a
single normal message transmission also cannot be completed
due to infinite waiting in the IEEE802.11a MAC scheme.
In the second set of experiments, we repeat all steps using the
map of Texas. Recall that Texas mainly contains highways and
that vehicles travel at much higher speeds that in Washington,
DC. We also put the results in Figs. 3–5 for easier comparison.
We can see that, in Texas, the delay performance has the
same trend as in Washington, DC: The fewer the number of
credentials that a vehicle is allowed to pick, the longer the
delay that is required due to the aforementioned two reasons.
Although a vehicle leaves an RSU sooner than vehicles in
Washington, DC, the processing delay required is still less than
0.4% of the duration that the vehicle stays in an RSU’s range.
Thus, there should be sufficient time for a vehicle to complete
the whole querying process.
The message overhead performance and the success rate
performance (as shown in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively) are almost
the same as in the Washington, DC case, and therefore, we skip
the explanations here.
In short, by allowing a querying vehicle to obtain more
than one credential from an RSU (the vehicle then presents
all these vehicles to the QSP), an obvious improvement in
terms of processing delay and message overhead can be ob-
tained. Nevertheless, there are two minor drawbacks as follows:
1) the querying vehicle needs to perform more processing
on the credentials (more decryptions and verifications), but
because the decryptions and verifications of credentials are per-
formed by a computer device but not by tamper-proof device,
there should be no affordability problem, and 2) the QSP needs
to keep more information and, possibly, more complicated
processing (instead of one credential, it needs to store and
process a subset of credentials for each querying vehicle), but
because the QSP is a server in the backbone, processing power,
memory, and storage should not be critical issues.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a scheme for providing a confidential and
privacy-preserving querying service in VANETs. A vehicle can
issue any kind of query without leaking its real identity to
anyone using our scheme. A vehicle only needs to present a
subset of RSU-indistinguishable credentials to the QSP to use
the service. With the principle of OT, no one can link up a
vehicle’s query and its real identity, although all RSUs, TAs,
and QSPs collude. Based on a simulation study, we show that
our scheme is effective in processing delay, message overhead,
and success rate. For future work, we will implement our
scheme on a testbed. In addition, we will consider other secure
applications in VANETs, such as secure navigations and on-
VANET shops.
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